As two most prevalent microscopic mechanisms of strategy spreading, frequency-dependent Moran process and pairwise comparison process are widely used to model population traits' evolution in evolutionary game dynamics. For several specific fitness or imitation mappings, these two microscopic processes can lead to identical evolutionary outcomes under weak selection. But, does this equivalent relation hold for any forms of fitness and imitation mappings? In this paper, we propose two generalized mappings that fitness (imitation probability) is an any non-negative function of payoff (payoff difference) and selection intensity, and investigate whether these unifying mappings can lead to equivalent evolutionary outcomes in stochastic game dynamics. By calculating the fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection, we find that the generalized mappings unify these two quantities by a constant factor under mild conditions. With this constant factor, the effects of different fitness and imitation probability functions on evolutionary outcomes just make the selection intensity or payoff matrix change a scale, which recovers the previous results as special cases. Thus, irrespective of the scaling factor, any two fitness or imitation probability functions are equivalent under weak selection. Particularly, the choice of fitness and imitation probability mappings significantly determines the direction of one-third law and risk dominance by the scaling factor. This work may thus enrich the knowledge of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since Maynard-Smith and Price laid the foundation of evolutionary game theory [1] [2] [3] , it has become a powerful mathematical framework to model biological and social evolution in a population consisting of different types of interacting individuals under frequency dependent selection. Traditionally, a widely used system that focuses on the effects of frequency-dependent selection is the replicator dynamics [4] [5] [6] , in which the population is infinitely well-mixed, and the stochastic effect is exclusively overlooked, usually. However, for a more realistic situation where the population is finite and subject to fluctuations [7, 8] , this deterministic selection process is augmented and disturbed by random drift [9, 10] . In such finite populations with fluctuations, therefore, stochastic evolutionary game dynamics has been widely adopted as a standard method to investigate the evolution of different traits [11] [12] [13] .
In addition to the mathematically unmanageable Wright-Fisher process [14] [15] [16] [17] , frequency-dependent Moran process [18, 19] and pairwise comparison process [20] [21] [22] are two most prevalent microscopic mechanisms to model the traits' evolution of different agents in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. For the former -Moran process, an individual is selected randomly for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness, which measures a phenotype's ability to survive and produce offspring. Usually, the fitness is assumed to be a convex combination of a background fitness (which * longwang@pku.edu.cn is set to one) and the payoff from the game [18, 19] . This linear mapping can conveniently lead to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness [23] [24] [25] [26] , but makes it difficult to give an analytical understanding of the evolutionary outcomes for strong selection. If the fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff, however, the analytical results can be obtained for any selection intensity [13, [27] [28] [29] . In addition, Malthusian fitness and Wrightian fitness are also two fundamental fitness mappings in theoretical biology [30, 31] . While for the latter -pairwise comparison process, two individuals, a focal player and a role model, are sampled at random from the population. Then the focal individual imitates the strategy of the role model with a probability depending on the payoff comparison [20, 22] . Therein, considering the effect of noise on strategic learning, the Fermi function in statistic physics has been widely used to model this imitation property [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] . Particularly, for investigating the universal properties between Moran and pairwise comparison process, two general mappings that fitness (imitation probability) is defined by an any non-negative function of the product of payoff (payoff difference) and selection intensity [39] [40] [41] , have been proposed recently. But for the most popular setting in which fitness is a convex combination of a background fitness and the payoff from the game [18, 19] , and the imitation probability based on local information [20, 42] , these so-called general mappings are not so universal, although most fitness or imitation probability mappings adopted in stochastic evolutionary game theory accord with the form of the product [27, 39, 43, 44] .
Since microscopic models of strategic propagation are typically stochastic in finite populations, the outcome de-scribing evolutionary success of a strategy can only be characterized in a probabilistic way. Two quantities of most interest are the fixation probability that a mutant invades a resident population and takes over the entire population, and the fixation time associated with this process [13, 14, [45] [46] [47] . The former measures the preference of natural selection whereas the latter characterizes the velocity of reaching fixation. Essentially, both frequency-dependent Moran process and pairwise comparison process are birth-death process with two absorbing states in mathematics. Thus, the symmetry of fixation times always holds for these two microscopic models [45, 48] , which importantly denies the possibility that two strategies fixate with the same probability but at different speeds in principle. In particular, both fixation probabilities and fixation times in the frequencydependent Moran process where fitness is defined as a linear or exponential function of payoff are identical under weak selection [13, 27, 49] , even in the presence of mutations [50, 51] . Moreover, it has been demonstrated that identical or similar evolutionary results also share for a wide class of different microscopic processes in the limit of weak selection [18, [51] [52] [53] [54] , such as the Moran process with a linear or exponential fitness mapping and pairwise comparison process using Fermi function as the imitation probability mapping [13, 39, 54] . Clearly, this equivalence is only partial or just holds for several specific cases of fitness and imitation functions. Naturally, it motivates us to think some general problems: for a specific microscopic process such as Moran process or pairwise comparison process, how do different fitness or imitation mappings influence the outcomes of evolutionary dynamics, especially under weak selection? Whether is it possible that different fitness or imitation probability functions are equivalent for a specific microscopic process, or further what conditions will make them be equivalent? Likewise, between two different microscopic processes, the similar problems are also present.
To give a preliminary answer to these questions, we propose two generalized mappings that fitness (imitation probability) is an any non-negative function of two variables on payoff (payoff difference) and selection intensity. From the perspective of the evolutionary outcomes of microscopic processes, we mainly investigate the effects of different fitness and imitation probability mappings on fixation probabilities and fixation times, especially under weak selection. Surprisingly, if some specific conditions are fulfilled for fitness and imitation probability functions, the generalized mappings unify the formulae of fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection by a constant factor, with which the selection intensity or payoff matrix changes a scale. Thus, in this sense, any two fitness or imitation probability functions are equivalent under weak selection. In addition, the sign of the constant factor, which is dependent on the second order mixed partial derivative of fitness or imitation probability functions, determines the direction of one-third law and risk dominance.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, we describe the frequency-dependent Moran process and pairwise comparison process with introducing generalized mappings, and give the closed-form of fixation probabilities and fixation times for these two types of processes. In Sec. III, we derive the approximations of fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection for both microscopic evolutionary processes, and show our main conclusions for the equivalent relation, one-third law, and risk dominance before giving a discussion in Sec. IV.
II. MODEL AND METHODS
In a finite well-mixed population of size N , let us consider a symmetric two-player game with strategies A and B. A player of strategy A obtains payoff a when interacting with another A player, but b when interacting with a B player. Likewise, a player of strategy B obtains payoff c when interacting with an A player, and payoff d when interacting with another B player. Thus, it leads to the payoff matrix
If i players adopt strategy A, under random mating and excluding self-interactions, every A player will interact with N − i opponents using strategy B and i − 1 opponents using strategy A. Therefore, the average payoff for an A player is given by
Similarly, the average payoff for a B player is
Then, the difference of average payoffs between strategy A and B is
where
Then the evolution of strategies is formulated as a Moran process with frequency-dependent fitness, or a pairwise comparison process depending on payoff differences. In Moran process, an individual is selected randomly for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness, which is usually mapped into a linear [18] or exponential [27] function of payoff. And then one identical offspring replaces another randomly chosen individual. While in pairwise comparison process, two individuals are sampled randomly and then a focal player imitates the strategy of the role model with a probability depending on the payoff comparison, which is usually modeled by a Fermi function [32] [33] [34] . Abstracting from the usual settings, here we propose two generalized mappings: the fitness of a player is an any non-negative function of two variables on selection intensity and payoff f (β, π), and imitation probability is a probability function on selection intensity and payoff difference g(β, ∆π). In these two functions, β measures the intensity of selection, and π (∆π) measures the payoff (payoff difference) from game interactions. When β = 0, it corresponds to the neutral selection, under which each individual has an identical baseline fitness based on Moran process, or the strategy imitation is completely random based on pairwise comparison process. Thus, f (0, π) = f 0 always holds for Moran process, where f 0 denotes the baseline fitness, which is a constant. Accordingly, g(0, ∆π) = g 0 = 1/2 always holds for pairwise comparison process.
Since only a single individual reproduces at each time step for both processes, the number of focal A individuals can either increase by one, stay the same, or fall by one. And other changes for the number of focal A are always impossible, which leads these two microscopic processes to be a birth-death process with two absorbing states, all A and all B, in the absence of mutations. Then for Moran process, the transition probabilities that the number of focal A individuals changes from i to i ± 1 are given by
and
While for pairwise comparison process, they are given by
And for both processes, the probability to stay in the current state is 1 − T − i − T + i . In these two non-innovative game systems, one quantity of most interest is the fixation probability, φ i , which describes the probability that i individuals of type A reach fixation at all A. With the notion of two boundary conditions φ 0 = 0 and φ N = 1, and by solving the backward Kolmogorov equation [11, 14] , the fixation probability can be given by
is the ratio of transition probabilities, which measures at each point in the state space how likely it is that the process continues in a certain direction. If the ratio is close to zero, then it is more likely that the number of A individuals increases. If it is relatively large, the number of A individuals will be more likely to decrease.
Another significant quantity in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics with finite populations is the average time for a single mutant reaching fixation [13, 14, 45, 47] . For the general game of two strategies, there are two average times that attract much research attention. The first one is the unconditional average time of fixation t i , which is the expected value for the time until the population reaches one of the two absorbing states, all A and all B, when starting from the state i. Another is the conditional average time of fixation t A i , which specifies the expected time that the mutants of type A take to reach the absorbing state, all A, when starting from the state i. In particular, we are more interested in the average times, t 1 and t A 1 , when initially starting from a single A individual in a B resident population. In analogy to the calculation of fixation probabilities, with two boundary conditions, t 0 = 0 and t N = 0, and by solving the recurrence equation
, the unconditional fixation time t 1 can be given by [13, 14] 
In a similar way, with the notion of two boundary con-
leads to the conditional fixation time [13, 45] 
As the differences between Moran process and pairwise comparison process in these three quantities of interest only embody in the ratio of transition probabilities, we obtain the uniform formulation by introducing the notation γ j , which hides the differences of fitness and imitation probability mappings. Accordingly, these formulations above are valid for both frequency-dependent Moran process and pairwise comparison process.
III. RESULTS
Since most evolutionary changes in biology are near neutral such that selection pressure only has a small influence on the fitness of players and strategic learning, weak selection plays a significant role in the study of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics [18, 39, 40] . To give a clear insight into the evolutionary dynamics under weak selection, we continue to derive the approximations of the exact formulae for fixation probabilities and fixation times obtained above.
A. Fixation probabilities under weak selection
Based on Eqs. (5)- (7), first we obtain the ratio of transition probabilities for fitness-based Moran process (Moran) and imitation-based pairwise comparison process (PWC) as
Moran,
In the limit of weak selection, that is N β ≪ 1, the ratio γ j can be approximated to (see Appendix A for details)
) depends on the state variable j. Then leaving out the high order term on β, the product of ratio γ j can be simplified to
Comparing with the specific case where fitness is a linear or exponential function of payoff [13] , the influence of the generalized imitation probability function on the product of ratio γ j just rescales the selection intensity or payoff matrix by a constant factor, p 0 . Substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (8), we obtain the approximation of fixation probabilities under weak selection when initially starting from i individuals of strategy A for pairwise comparison process, given by
While for Moran process, it leads to
In particular, for the usual setting in which fitness is a linear or exponential function of payoff [18, 19, 27] , or even the form of f (βπ) [39] , the factor m j is always a constant irrespective of the state variable j. Therefore, if the generalized fitness function f (β, π) is chosen such that the factor m j is always a constant (denoted by m 0 ) irrespective of the state variable j, similarly we have
Based on Eqs. (14) and (16), we can find that the difference between Moran process and pairwise comparison process only embodies in the constant factors m 0 and p 0 , with which the generalized mappings unify the formulae of fixation probabilities under weak selection. Particularly, for the usual assumptions that fitness is mapped into one of the functions f (β, π) = 1 − β + βπ and f (β, π) = e βπ , or imitation probability is mapped into one of the functions 1/[1+exp(−β∆π)] and 1/2+β∆π/4, the constant factors, m 0 and p 0 , are both 1, which recovers the classical results [13, 18, 27] . Actually, these two constant factors, which depend on the choice of fitness and imitation probability functions, can be absorbed into the selection intensity by proper rescaling, or make all payoff values (a, b, c, and d) change a scale. In this sense, therefore, different choices of fitness functions for Moran process and imitation functions for pairwise comparison process, are equivalent in spite of the scaling factor.
B. Fixation times under weak selection
Next, we derive the linear approximations of the unconditional and conditional fixation times, t 1 and t A 1 , in the limit of weak selection N β ≪ 1. The general formulation of weak selection approximation is given by [49] 
Therefore, our main goal is to find the constant term and the coefficient of the first order term in Eq. (17) . Note that for the vanishing selection intensity β = 0, it corresponds to the case of neutral selection. That is, the mean times are typically not affected by the details of the evolutionary process. In this case, the neutral transition probabilities are T
for both processes, we have γ i = 1. Moreover, with the notion φ i | β=0 = i/N based on Eqs. (14) and (15), and referring to Eq. (9), we get the neutral unconditional time of fixation [49] 
1 l is the harmonic number. Similarly, the neutral conditional time of fixation t A 1 | β=0 is given by
To On the other hand, in light of the fixation probabilities under weak selection Eqs. (14) and (15), we have
PWC.
Comparing Eqs. (5) and (7), the inverse of the transition probability T + l under weak selection is given by
Moreover, according to the product of ratio of transition probabilities under weak selection Eq. (13), we have
(23) Substituting Eqs. (21)- (23) into Eq. (20) , for Moran process, the linear term of unconditional and conditional fixation times under weak selection is given by
where s = 1 for unconditional fixation times, and s = l for conditional fixation times. In particular, if the generalized fitness function f (β, π) is chosen such that the factor m j is always a constant m 0 , it yields (see Appendix B for details)
leads to the complete formulation of unconditional and conditional fixation times under weak selection
While for pairwise comparison process, the calculation will be more tedious (see Appendix B for details). With introducing the notation (u * , v * ) = (u, v) · p 0 , the linear term of unconditional fixation time can be written as
In combination with Eqs. (18) and (19) , the approximations of unconditional and conditional fixation times under weak selection for pairwise comparison process are given by
In particular, if an additional condition ∂g ∂β (0, ∆π) = ∂ 2 g ∂β∂∆π (0, 0)·∆π is fulfilled for imitation probability functions, we have
In this context, the unconditional and conditional fixation times under weak selection for pairwise comparison process are given by
Interestingly, for frequency-dependent Moran process, if the generalized fitness function is chosen such that the factor m j is always a constant (denoted by m 0 ) irrespective of the state variable j, the influence of different fitness functions on the average (unconditional and conditional) fixation times under weak selection just embodies in the constant factor m 0 . Similarly, for pairwise comparison process, if the additional condition ∂g ∂β (0, ∆π) = ∂ 2 g ∂β∂∆π (0, 0) · ∆π is fulfilled, a similar result is also valid, but the difference is that the constant factor changes to p 0 . By proper rescaling, actually these two constants can be absorbed into the selection intensity, or make all payoff values (a, b, c, and d) change a scale in view of the exact formulations of u and v. Such results are in agreement with the findings obtained from fixation probabilities. In this sense, therefore, the conclusion that any two fitness and imitation probability functions are equivalent under weak selection still holds. In particular, if the fitness function adopts the linear or exponential form, and the imitation probability is modeled by a Fermi function, both m 0 and p 0 are 1, which recovers the previous results [49] as special cases. Moreover, in spite of the population size N and the constant factors m 0 and p 0 , the unconditional fixation time t 1 (conditional fixation time t A 1 ) under weak selection only depends on the term v (u), which greatly extends the previous understanding [49] .
C. Equivalence
By calculating the fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection, we have obtained some significant properties between Moran process and pairwise comparison process. Based on the results of fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection, here we give the equivalence induced by generalized mappings in Moran process and pairwise comparison process. Specifically, for frequency-dependent Moran process with a generalized fitness function f (β, π), if the second order mixed partial derivative of f (β, π) at (0, π) exists and the value of
is a constant irrespective of the state variable j, we know that the fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection are given by
where f (0, π) = f 0 and m 0 = 1 f0 ∂ 2 f ∂β∂π (0, π) are both constant, and H N = N l=1 1 l is the harmonic number. The influence of any two different fitness functions on evolutionary outcomes just embodies in the constant factor m 0 before the linear term. Thus, in this sense, for two arbitrary fitness mappings, f 1 and f 2 , meeting the conditions defined above, they are equivalent under weak selection. The equivalence means that the difference of fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection just rescales the payoff matrix or intensity of selection by a constant factor m 0 .
Particularly, if the fitness function adopts one of the function family = 1, 2, 3, ...) , where a j and b i are constant coefficients, then we have the same factor m 0 = b 1 /a 0 . Interestingly, if m 0 = b 1 /a 0 = 1, these two function families are equivalent to the prevalent fitness mappings 1 − β + βπ and exp(βπ) under weak selection (see Fig. 1 ). Actually, the Taylor series of exp(βπ) at β = 0 is just the function family F 1 when specific coefficients a 0 = 1, a j = 0 (j = 0), b 1 = 1, and b i = 1/(ib i−1 ) are applied.
Similarly, for pairwise comparison process with a general imitation function g(β, ∆π), where g(0, ∆π) = g 0 = 1/2 always holds in view of the case of neutral selection, if the second order mixed partial derivative of g(β, ∆π) at (0, 0) exists, and the condition g β (0, ∆π) = ∂ 2 g ∂β∂∆π (0, 0) · ∆π is met, then the fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection are given by
where 1 l is the harmonic number. The influence of any two different imitation probability functions on evolutionary outcomes also embodies in a constant factor p 0 before the linear term. Thus, for two arbitrary imitation probability functions, g 1 and g 2 , meeting the conditions defined above, they are equivalent under weak selection. The equivalence means that the difference of fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection just rescales the payoff matrix or intensity of selection by a constant factor p 0 .
Surprisingly, in comparison with the fitness function families F 1 and F 2 , the function families with a completely analogous formulation
, where c j and k i are constant coefficients, and particularly c 0 = 1/2, c 1 = 0, and k 1 = ∂ 2 Gs ∂β∂∆π (0, 0) (s = 1 for G 1 and s = 2 for G 2 ), are a class of imitation probability functions meeting the conditions given in pairwise comparison process. Particularly, if k 1 = 1/4, these two function families are equivalent to the popular Fermi function 1/(1 + e −β∆π ) under weak selection (see Fig. 1 ). Actually, with choosing specific coefficients, G 1 can also become the Taylor series of Fermi function at β = 0.
D. One-third law and risk-dominance
In stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, the notions of invasion and fixation are two fundamental concepts to describe the spreading of strategies in finite populations [11, 18] . Using the neutral game as benchmark, strategy A is shortly said to fixate in a resident population (selection favours A replacing B) if the fixation probability for a single A is larger than that in the neutral game [18, 19] . Thus, for frequency-dependent Moran process with a fitness function f (β, π), which fulfills that (14)). Under weak selection, then we have the following conclusions:
• When (2N − 4) . (33) Particularly, for sufficiently large population size N → +∞, it corresponds to one-third law in the case of coordination games (1/3 Fig. 2 ).
• When Particularly, for sufficiently large population size N → +∞, it corresponds to inverse one-third law in the case of coordination games (1/3 Fig. 2 ).
• When
∂β∂∆π (0, 0) = 0 for pairwise comparison process), the conditions for φ 1 > 1/N will depend on the high order coefficients of β in φ 1 under weak selection. Actually, the calculations of high order coefficients under weak selection are more tedious than the linear approximation, which can refer to Refs. [39, 55] .
Except for the underlying principle that determines the conditions to favour strategy A replacing B, it is also of interest to ask whether strategy A is more likely to replace B than vice versa [18] . First, let ρ A (ρ B ) denotes the fixation probability that a single individual using strategy A (B) invades and takes over a resident population of B (A) players. Accordingly, we have ρ A = φ 1 . And note that the probability ρ B is equal to that N − 1 individuals of A strategy fail to take over a population in which there is just a single B individual, then we have ρ B = 1 − φ N −1 . Based on Eq. (8), the ratio of these two fixation probabilities is thus given by
In addition, if
is always a constant irrespective of the state variable j, then depending on Eq. (13), the ratio under weak selection can be approximated to
where s = m 0 for Moran process, and s = p 0 for pairwise comparison process, which are both constants that can be absorbed into intensity of selection or make the payoff matrix change a scale. Therefore, under weak selection we have the following conclusions:
• When 
Particularly, for sufficiently large population size N → +∞, it corresponds to that A is riskdominant in the case of coordination games (1/2 Fig. 2 ).
Particularly, for sufficiently large population size N → +∞, it corresponds to that B is riskdominant in the case of coordination games (1/2 Fig. 2 ).
• When ∂β∂∆π (0, 0) = 0 for pairwise comparison process), the conditions for ρ A > ρ B will depend on the high order coefficients of β in ρ B /ρ A under weak selection. Similarly, the calculations of high order approximation under weak selection will be more tedious, which can refer to Refs. [39, 55] .
In particular, if we additionally consider the case where non-uniform mutations occur between the two strategies, that strategy A is more abundant than B in the long run is determined by [56] 
where µ AB and µ BA denote the mutation rates from A to B and from B to A, respectively. For µ AB = µ BA , we find that the conclusions obtained above are still valid.
IV. DISCUSSION
Fitness-based Moran process and imitation-based pairwise comparison process are two most prevalent microscopic mechanisms for modeling strategic updating in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. The former mainly relates to the population genetics, whereas the latter involves cultural propagation [14, 22, 41] . Based on a pair of specific fitness and imitation probability mappings, it has been demonstrated that these two microscopic processes lead to identical or similar evolutionary outcomes [13, 18, 49, 51] . However, the question of how adopting different fitness or imitation probability functions influences the evolutionary outcomes, is always left in the basket. And it is still unclear what the discrimination of the effects of different microscopic processes on dynamical outcomes is in a given population [40, 41] . To give a preliminary insight into these questions, we propose two generalized mappings for fitness and imitation probability functions and calculate the fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection.
Relative to the previous notion that fitness (imitation
The choice of fitness mapping f (β, π) and imitation probability mapping g(β, ∆π) determines the direction of one-third law and risk dominance. When (0, 0) < 0 for pairwise comparison process, then the direction of one-third law and risk dominance will be inverse (b). Otherwise, the conditions for ρA > 1/N and ρA > ρB will depend on the high order coefficients of fixation probabilities under weak selection, vice versa.
probability) is a function of the product of payoff (payoff difference) and selection intensity [39] [40] [41] , the generalized mappings proposed in this paper decouple the product in order to satisfy any function forms of fitness and imitation probability. Accordingly, the universality of weak selection [39] reduces to a specific case in the framework of our mappings. Particularly, if some specific conditions are fulfilled for fitness and imitation probability functions, the effects of any two different fitness or imitation probability mappings on evolutionary outcomes just change the constant factor before the selection intensity in fixation probabilities and fixation times. Thus, when the fitness is mapped into a linear or exponential function of payoff, or using Fermi function as the imitation probability mapping, our results recover the previous findings [49] as specifical cases. In this sense, our work thus greatly extends the previous understanding of weak selection approximation for fixation probabilities and fixation times.
Except for some fundamental differences between Moran and pairwise comparison process [40, 41] , the equivalent properties between these two microscopic processes have also been highlighted [13, 27, 54] . However, previous results mainly focus on fixation probabilities based on a pair of specific fitness and imitation probability functions [13, 27] , for which the constant factor is 1 in the framework of our general mappings. Here we demonstrate that this equivalent property holds for a large class of fitness and imitation probability functions, with focusing on both fixation probabilities and fixation times. Using a general function form for fitness and imitation probability mappings, we find that the generalized function unifies the formulae of fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak selection by a constant factor if two differential conditions are fulfilled. Actually, by proper rescaling, this constant factor can be absorbed into the selection intensity or payoff matrix. Thus, in spite of the scaling factor, any two fitness and imitation probability mappings are equivalent under weak selection.
In stochastic evolutionary game dynamics, one-third law and risk dominance are two most fundamental results under frequency-dependent weak selection [11, 18] . Particularly, the basic one-third law has been demonstrated for many other processes [15, 53, 57] , such as the Wright-Fisher process [15, 52, 53] where the Kingman coalescent method [58] is applied. However, using a generalized mapping as fitness or imitation probability functions, the classical one-third law and risk dominance only hold for that the second order mixed partial derivative of the generalized mapping is great than zero. Otherwise, the direction of one-third law and risk dominance will be reverse or depends on high order approximation of fixation probabilities. This finding greatly enriches the understanding of one-third law and risk dominance.
Undeniably, our main focus is just cast into weak selection because of biological relevance, although strong selection [43, 59, 60] attracts much attention recently. But in the limit of strong selection, usually, the dynamic outcomes of stochastic systems are nearly determinant and do not rely on the specific forms of fitness and imitation probability functions [59, 60] . Therefore, in this sense, different fitness and imitation probability mappings are always equivalent. In addition, for any moderate intensity of selection [27] , indeed the general mappings proposed in our work may not provide a clear insight into the dynamics of stochastic systems, because the abstract mappings hide the specific forms of fitness and imitation probability. In the future, investigating the equivalent properties in other microscopic processes [15, 52, 53] , in the multiplayer games [25, 28] , or on the graph [33, 60] is still worth the effort. 
where s = 1 for unconditional fixation times, and s = l for conditional fixation times. Therein, the first two double sums can be solved with the help of the calculations [49] ,
While for the third term which is more complicated, we refer to the calculations for finite triple sums [49] N −1 
